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a b s t r a c t
We describe a practical identity-based encryption scheme that is secure in the standard
model against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our construction applies ‘‘direct chosen-
ciphertext techniques’’ to Waters’ chosen-plaintext secure scheme and is not based
on hierarchical identity-based encryption. Furthermore, we give an improved concrete
security analysis for Waters’ scheme. As a result, one can instantiate the scheme in smaller
groups, resulting in efficiency improvements.
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1. Introduction
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is a public-key encryption scheme where any string is a valid public key. In
particular, email addresses and dates can be public keys. The ability to use identities as public keys minimizes the need to
distribute public-key certificates. The concept of IBE was proposed by Shamir [54] in the early eighties, but coming up with
a satisfactory instantiation of it remained an open problem for almost two decades. It was not until 2001 that IBE systems
were constructed by using bilinear maps [50,12,13]. In particular, Boneh and Franklin [12,13] proposed formal security
notions for IBE systems and designed a fully functional secure IBE scheme using bilinear maps. This scheme and the tools
developed in its design have been successfully applied in numerous cryptographic settings, transcending by far the identity-
based cryptography framework. An alternative but less efficient IBE construction based on quadratic residues was proposed
by Cocks [20]. IBE is currently in the process of getting standardized — the new IEEE P1363.3 standard for ‘‘identity-based
cryptographic techniques using pairings’’ is currently in preparation [33], as well as the IETF memos RFC 5091, RFC 5408
and RFC 5409 [35].
All the above IBE schemes provide security against chosen-ciphertext attacks through the Fujisaki–Okamoto [24]
transformation. In a chosen-ciphertext attack [48], the adversary is given access to a decryption oracle that allows him
to obtain the decryptions of ciphertexts of his choosing. Intuitively, security in this setting means that an adversary obtains
effectively no information about encrypted messages, provided the corresponding ciphertexts are never submitted to
the decryption oracle. For different reasons, the notion of chosen-ciphertext security has emerged as the ‘‘right’’ notion
of security for encryption schemes. We stress that, in general, chosen-ciphertext security is a much stronger security
requirement than chosen-plaintext attacks [2], where in the latter an attacker is not given access to the decryption oracle.
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The drawback of the IBE scheme from Boneh–Franklin and Cocks is that security can only be guaranteed in the random
oraclemodel [5], i.e., in an idealized world where all parties get black-box access to a truly random function. Unfortunately
a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as a heuristic argument and has proved to possibly lead to insecure
schemes in the standardmodel (see, e.g., [16]). More importantly, there exist results [22] indicating that even certain natural
cryptographic schemes (such as full-domain hash signatures [6]) will always remain in the grey area of schemes having a
proof in the random oracle yet are ‘‘provably unprovable’’ in the standard model.
Waters’ IBE. To fill this gapWaters [58] presents the first practical identity-based encryption scheme that is chosen-plaintext
secure without random oracles. The proof of his scheme makes use of an algebraic method first used by Boneh and Boyen
[8,9] and security of the scheme is based on the Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellman (BDDH) assumption. However, Waters’
plain IBE scheme is insecure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
From 2-level Hierarchical IBE to chosen-chipertext secure IBE.Hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [32,27] is a
generalization of IBE allowing for hierarchical delegation of decryption keys. Recent results from Boneh, Canetti, Halevi, and
Katz [17,14,11] show a generic transformation from any chosen-plaintext secure 2-level HIBE scheme to a chosen-ciphertext
secure IBE scheme. We will refer to it as the BCHK transformation. Since Waters’ IBE scheme can naturally be extended to a
2-level HIBE this implies a chosen-ciphertext secure IBE in the standard model. Key size, as well as the security reduction of
the resulting scheme are comparable to the ones fromWaters’ IBE. However, the transformation involves some symmetric
overhead to the ciphertext in form of a one-time signature or a MAC/commitment scheme with their respective keys.
Direct chosen-ciphertext techniques for public-key encryption. In [15,38] ‘‘direct chosen-ciphertext’’ techniques were
developed to improve efficiency of certain concrete public-key encryption schemes obtained from the BCHK transformation
(applied to the IBE-schemes from [8]). Their methods are no longer generic but for particular encryption schemes
[15,38,39] the overhead of the one-time signature or MAC can be completely avoided.
Identity-based key encapsulation. Instead of providing the full functionality of an IBE scheme, in many applications it is
sufficient to let sender and receiver agree on a common random session key. This can be accomplished with an identity-
based key-encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM) as formalized in [21,7]. Any IB-KEM can be bootstrapped to a full IBE scheme
by adding a symmetric encryption scheme (also called data encapsulation scheme — DEM) with appropriate security
properties [21]. There are a numerous practical reasons to prefer a IB-KEM over an IBE scheme, which is why for traditional
public-key encryption the modular KEM/DEM approach is incorporated in many recent standards (e.g., [55,1,34]).
1.1. Our contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
Adirect chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEMbasedonWaters’ IBE.Ourmain idea is to extend the ‘‘direct chosen-ciphertext’’
techniques from [15,38] to the the identity-based setting.We enhance the IB-KEM version ofWaters chosen-plaintext secure
IBE by adding some redundant information to the ciphertext, consisting of a single group element, to make it chosen-
ciphertext secure. This information is used to check whether a given IB-KEM ciphertext was ‘‘properly generated’’ by the
encryption algorithm or not; if so decryption is done as before, otherwise the ciphertext is simply rejected. Intuitively,
this ‘‘consistency check’’ is what gives us the necessary leverage to deal with the stronger chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Unfortunately, implementing the consistency check is relatively expensive and an equivalent ‘‘implicit rejection’’ method
is used to improve efficiency. This provides a direct construction of a chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM that is not explicitly
derived from hierarchical techniques [11]. Like Waters’ scheme, our scheme can be proved secure under the BDDH
assumption in pairing groups. Furthermore, our IB-KEM scheme can be extended in a natural way to obtain a chosen-
ciphertext secure HIB-KEM.
A tighter security reduction. In terms of concrete security, our security reduction is significantly tighter than the one
given by Waters [58]. (Our new analysis can be applied to both Waters’ original scheme and our chosen-ciphertext secure
IB-KEM.) More precisely, let A be an adversary against Waters’ IBE scheme that runs in time at most TA, makes at most q
queries to its key-derivation oracle and has advantage εA. Then [58, Theorem 1] presents a BDDH adversary B that runs in
time at most TB and has advantage εB such that εB = Ω(εA/nq) and TB = TA + Tsim + Tabort, where: n is the bit-length of
the identities; Tsim = q · TPG and TPG is the time for one exponentiation/pairing computation in PG; TZ is the time for one
addition over integers smaller than 2q; and ignoring log-terms
Tabort(k) = O˜
(
q2n2 · ε−2A (k)
) · TZ.
Here Tabort denotes the time B needs to compute the probability whether it has to do an ‘‘artificial abort’’. Actually, Tabort
as computed in [58] only shows a qn factor, but this was corrected in [4] to a q2n2 factor. By an improved analysis we can
reduce the running time of Tabort to
Tabort(k) = O˜
(
n3 · ε−2A (k)
) · TZ,
while the success probability stays the same. For concreteness, realistic values for k = 80 bit security are q = 230 and
n = 160, so our reduction is significantly tighter than the one by Waters. As a result, one can securely use smaller groups,
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resulting in significant efficiency improvements. At a technical level our improved reduction makes use of a lower and an
upper bound on the abortion probability during the execution of B (cf. Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3), whereasWaters only provides a
lower bound. This makes it possible to substantially decrease the number of samples the simulator has to compute in order
to approximate the probability it has to perform an artificial abort. We stress that our proof inherits the ‘‘artificial abort’’
technique by Waters.
Arigorous game-based proof. The proof ofWaters’ IBE is already quite complex and hasmany technical parts thatwe found
hard to verify. Additionally, many other results (e.g., [15,18,43]) already use ingredients of Waters’ IBE, some more or less
in a ‘‘black-box’’ manner which makes verification nearly impossible without having completely understood the original
work. Motivated by this we give a rigorous, games-based proof of our result that can be easily understood and verified.
1.2. Comparison and related work
We carefully review all known chosen-ciphertext secure IBE constructions and make an extensive comparison with our
scheme. It turns out that, to the best of our knowledge, our scheme is themost efficient chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme
in the standard model based on the the BDDH assumption.
In (the full version of) [15] a technique is sketchedhow to avoid the BCHK transformation to get a direct chosen-ciphertext
secure IB-KEM construction based on Waters’ 2-level HIBE. Compared to our IBE, however, this construction has a weaker
security reduction and nearly doubles the public-key size. We mention other chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme that
were proposed concurrently or after the publication of the extended abstract of this article [40]. The one by Gentry [26]
relies on a much stronger security assumption, the q-ABDHE assumption, where the strength of the assumption degrades
on the number of established user secret keys. Even though it has relatively short public keys, the ciphertext size of Gentry’s
scheme is much larger, resulting in a bigger disadvantage. The scheme by Kiltz and Vahlis [37,41] combines our direct
chosen-ciphertext security techniques with the HIBE scheme from [10] to reduce the ciphertext size of the IBE scheme. The
disadvantage is a slightly stronger security assumption. Similar results were obtained by Chatterjee and Sarkar [19,52], who
also propose a HIBE scheme from the BDDH assumption which is related to our proposal in Section 5.
Concurrently to the preparation of this article, Bellare and Ristenpart [4] present a new security analysis of Waters’ IBE
that completely avoids the artificial abort and therefore implies a tighter security reduction to the BDDH assumption.
1.3. Publication info
An extended abstract of this paperwas published in the proceedings of ACISP 2006 [40]. This is the full version, containing
improved concrete security bounds, missing proofs as well as a detailed comparison of our scheme with previous IB-KEM
constructions.
2. Definitions
2.1. Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1k denotes the string of
k ones. If S is a set then s
$← S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random.WewriteA(x, y, . . .)
to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z $← A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A with
inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write AO1,O2,...(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs
x, y, . . . and access to oraclesO1,O2, . . . and by z
$← AO1,O2,...(x, y, . . .)we denote the operation of runningAwith inputs
(x, y, . . .) and access to oracles O1,O2, . . ., and letting z be the output.
2.2. Identity-based key encapsulation
An identity-based key-encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM) scheme [54,13] IBKEM = (Kg, Extract, Encaps,Decaps)
consists of four polynomial-time algorithms. Via (pk, sk)
$← Kg(1k) the randomized key-generation algorithm produces
master keys for security parameter k ∈ N; via usk[id] $← Extract(sk, id) the master computes the secret key for identity
id; via (C, K)
$← Encaps(pk, id) a sender creates a random session key K and a corresponding ciphertext C with respect to
identity id; via K ← Decaps(pk, id, usk[id], C) the possessor of secret key sk decapsulates ciphertext C to get back a session
key K . Associated to the scheme is a key space K. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id, and all
(C, K)
$← Encaps(pk, id), we have Pr[Decaps(pk, id, Extract(sk, id), C) = K ] = 1, where the probability is taken over the
choice of (pk, sk)
$← Kg(1k), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
The strongest and commonly accepted notion of security for an identity-based key-encapsulation scheme is that of
indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. This notion, denoted IND-CCA, is defined using the following
game between a challenger and an adversary A. Let IBKEM = (Kg, Extract, Encaps,Decaps) be an IB-KEM with
associated key space K.
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The security we require the IBKEM is IND-CCA security [48]. For an adversary Awe define the advantage function
Advibkem-ccaIBKEM ,A(k) =
∣∣∣Pr[Expibkem-cca-1IBKEM ,A(k) = 1] − Pr[Expibkem-cca-0IBKEM ,A(k) = 1]∣∣∣
where, for γ ∈ {0, 1}, Expibkem-cca-γIBKEM ,A is defined by the following experiment.
Experiment Expibkem-cca-γIBKEM ,A(k)
(pk, sk)
$← Kg(1k)
(id∗, St) $← AEx(·),Dec(·,·)(find, pk)
K ∗0
$← K ; (C∗, K ∗1 ) $← Encaps(pk, id∗)
γ ′ $← AEx(·),Dec(·,·)(guess, K ∗γ , C∗, St)
Return γ ′.
The oracle Ex(id) returns usk[id] $← Extract(sk, id) with the restriction that A is not allowed to query oracle
Ex(·) for the target identity id∗. The oracle Dec(id, C) first computes usk[id] $← Ex(sk, id) and then returns K ←
Decaps(pk, id, usk[id], C)with the restriction that in the guess stage A is not allowed to query oracle Dec(·, ·) for the tuple
(id∗, C∗). Here the output of Ex(id) is stored internally by the experiment and multiple queries to Dec(id, ·) are answered
with respect to the same user secret key usk[id]. The variable St represents some internal state information of adversary A
and can be any polynomially-bounded string.
Expibkem-cca-1IBKEM ,A is called the real CCA experiment (with the real challenge key K
∗
1 ), and Exp
ibkem-cca-0
IBKEM ,A is called the random
CCA experiment (with a random challenge key K ∗0 ).
An IB-KEM IBKEM is said to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA secure) if the advantage functions
Advibkem-ccaIBKEM ,A(k) is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
We remark that our security definition is given with respect to ‘‘full-identity’’ attacks, as opposed to the much weaker
variant of ‘‘selective-identity’’ attacks where the adversary has to commit to its target identity id∗ in advance, even before
seeing the public key.
2.3. Target collision resistant hash functions
TCR = (TCRk)k∈N is a family of keyed hash function TCRsk : G→ Zp for each `(k)-bit key s, where `(·) is a non-negative
integer-valued polynomially-bounded function and p is a primewith polynomially-bounded bit-length. It is assumed target
collision resistant (TCR) [21], which is captured by defining the tcr-advantage of an adversaryH as
AdvtcrTCR,H(k) = Pr[TCRs(c∗) = TCRs(c) ∧ c 6= c∗ : s $← {0, 1}`(k) ; c∗ $← G ; c $← H(s, c∗)].
Note TCR is a weaker requirement than collision-resistance, so that, in particular, any practical collision-resistant function
can be used. Also note that our notion of TCR is related to the stronger notion of universal one-way hashing [46], where in
the security experiment of the latter the target value c∗ is chosen by the adversary (but before seeing the hash key s).
Commonly [21,42] this function is implemented using a dedicated cryptographic hash function like MD5 or SHA, which
is assumed to be target collision resistant. Alternatively, target collision resistant hashing can be constructed from any one-
way function [46,49]. However, these generic constructions are somewhat inefficient. Since in our case |G| = |Zp| = p,
we can alternatively also use a non-keyed bijective encoding function TCR∗ : G → Zp. In that case we have a perfect
collision resistant hash function, i.e. AdvtcrTCR∗,H(k) = 0. Boyen, Mei and Waters [15] note that for bilinear maps defined on
supersingular elliptic curves there exists a very efficient way to implement such injective mappings. We refer to [15] for
more details.
3. Assumptions
3.1. Parameter generation algorithms for bilinear groups
All pairing-based schemes will be parameterized by a pairing parameter generator. This is a randomized polynomial-time
algorithm G that on input 1k returns the description of anmultiplicative cyclic groupG1 of prime order p, where 22k < p, the
description of a multiplicative cyclic groupGT of the same order, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairing eˆ : G1 ×G1 → GT .
See [13] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We use G∗1 to denote G1 \ {0}, i.e. the set of all group elements
except the neutral element. Throughout the paper we use PG = (G1,GT , p, eˆ) as shorthand for the description of bilinear
groups.
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Kg(1k)
u1, u2, α
$← G1 ; z ← eˆ(g, α)
H
$← HGen(n)
pk← (u1, u2, z,H) ; sk← α
Return (pk, sk)
Encaps(pk, id)
r
$← Z∗p
c1 ← g r ; t ← TCR(c1)
c2 ← H(id)r
c3 ← (ut1u2)r
K ← zr ∈ GT
C ← (c1, c2, c3) ∈ G31
Return (K , C)
Extract(pk, sk, id)
s
$← Zp
usk[id] ← (α · H(id)s, g s) ∈ G21
Return usk[id]
Decaps(pk, id, usk[id], C)
Parse C as (c1, c2, c3)
Parse usk[id] as (d1, d2)
t ← TCR(c1)
If (g, c1, ut1u2, c3) is not a DH tuple
or (g, c1,H(id), c2) is not a DH tuple
then return K
$← GT
else return K ← eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2)
Fig. 1. Our chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM IBKEM = (Kg, Extract, Encaps,Decaps).
3.2. The BDDH assumption
Let PG be the description of a pairing group. Consider the following problem first put forward by Joux [36] and later
formalized by Boneh and Franklin [13]: Given (g, ga, gb, gc,W ) ∈ G41 × GT as input, output yes if W = eˆ(g, g)abc and
no otherwise. More formally, to a parameter generation algorithm for pairing-groups G and an adversary B we define the
following advantage function
AdvbddhG,B (k) =
∣∣Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc,W ) = 1] − Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc) = 1]∣∣ ,
where g,W
$← G and a, b, c, r ← Zp.
We say that the Bilinear Decision Diffie–Hellman (BDDH) assumption relative to generator G holds if AdvbddhG,B is a negligible
function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries B. The BDDH assumption was shown to hold in the generic group model
in [10] and can be shown to be random self reducible by using similar techniques to those in [44].
4. A chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM based on BDDH
In this section we present our new chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM. From now on let PG = (G1,GT , p, eˆ, g) be public
system parameters obtained by running the group parameter algorithm G(1k).
4.1. Waters’ hash
We review the hash function H : {0, 1}n → G1 used in Waters’ identity-based encryption scheme [58]. On input of an
integer n, the randomized hash key generator HGen(n) chooses n+1 random groups elements h0, . . . , hn ∈ G1 and returns
h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn) as the public description of the hash function. The hash function H : {0, 1}n → G∗1 is evaluated on a
string id = (id1, . . . , idn) ∈ {0, 1}n as the product
H(id) = h0
n∏
i=1
hidii .
4.2. The IB-KEM construction
Let TCR : G1 → Zp be a target collision resistant hash function. Our IB-KEMwith identity space IDSp = {0, 1}n (n = n(k))
and key space K = GT is depicted in Fig. 1. For simplicity we assume that TCR is a fixed hash function such as an injective
encoding or SHA-1. Otherwise, if TCR is a keyed TCR function, a random key s has to be included in the scheme’s public key.
A tuple (h, ha, hb, hc) ∈ G41 is said to be a Diffie–Hellman tuple if ab = c mod p. Thanks to the properties of the bilinear
pairing, a tuple (g, u, v, w) ∈ G41 is Diffie–Hellman if and only if eˆ(g, w) = eˆ(v, u). Therefore the check in the decapsulation
algorithm Decaps can be implemented by evaluating the bilinear map four times.
Wenowshowcorrectness of the scheme, i.e., that the session keyK computed in the encapsulation algorithmmatches the
K computed in the decapsulation algorithm. A correctly generated ciphertext for identity id has the form C = (c1, c2, c3) =
(g r ,H(id)r , (ut1u2)
r) and therefore (g, c1, ut1u2, c3) = (g, g r , ut1u2, (ut1u2)r) is always aDH tuple. A correctly generated secret
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key for identity id has the form usk[id] = (d1, d2) = (α · H(id)s, g s). Therefore the decapsulation algorithm computes the
session key K as
K = eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2)
= eˆ(g r , α · H(id)s)/eˆ(H(id)r , g s)
= eˆ(g r , α) · eˆ(g r ,H(id)s)/eˆ(H(id)r , g s)
= zr · eˆ(g s,H(id)r)/eˆ(H(id)r , g s)
= zr ,
as the key computed in the encapsulation algorithm. This shows correctness.
Let C = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ G31 be a (possiblymalformed) ciphertext. Ciphertext C is called consistent w.r.t the public key pk and
identity id if (g, c1, ut1u2, c3) and (g, c1,H(id), c2) are Diffie–Hellman tuples, where t = TCR(c1). Note that any ciphertext
properly generated by the encapsulation algorithm is always consistent. The decapsulation algorithm tests for consistency of
the ciphertext. Note that this consistency test can be performed by anybody knowing the public key. We call this property
‘‘public verifiability’’ of the ciphertext. It is the key feature that allows building an efficient IB-KEM with non-interactive
threshold decryption as it was proposed in [25].
4.3. More efficient decapsulation from implicit rejection
We now describe an alternative decapsulation algorithm which is more efficient but slightly more technically involved.
The idea is to make the Diffie–Hellman consistency check implicit in the computation of the key K and it has already been
used in [38]. This is done by choosing random integers r1, r2 ∈ Z∗p and computing the session key as
K ← eˆ(c1, d1 · (u
t
1u2)
r1 · H(id)r2)
eˆ(c2, d2 · g r2) · eˆ(g r1 , c3) .
Weclaim that this is equivalent to first checking for consistency and returning a randomkey if not, and otherwise computing
the key as K ← eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) as in the original decapsulation algorithm.
To prove this claim we define the functions ∆1(C) = eˆ(c1, ut1u2)/eˆ(g, c3) and ∆2(C) = eˆ(H(id), c1)/eˆ(g, c2). Then
∆1(C) = ∆2(C) = 1 if and only if C is consistent. Consequently, for random r1, r2 ∈ Z∗p , K = eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) · (∆1(C))r1 ·
(∆2(C))r2 ∈ G∗T evaluates to eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) ∈ GT if C is consistent and to a random group element otherwise. The claim
then follows by
K = eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) ·∆1(C)r1 · (∆2(C))r2
= eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) · (eˆ(c1, ut1u2)/eˆ(g, c3))r1 · (eˆ(H(id), c1)/eˆ(g, c2))r2
= eˆ(c1, d1(u
t
1u2)
r1H(id)r2)
eˆ(c2, d2 · g r2) · eˆ(g r1 , c3) .
We remark that the alternative decapsulation algorithm saves four pairing operations in a naïve implementation (at the cost
of four exponentiations).
4.4. Relation to existing schemes
Relation to Waters’ IBE scheme. The ciphertext in our scheme is basically identical to the ciphertext from Waters’ IBE
scheme plus the redundant element c3 used to check for consistency of the ciphertext. HenceWaters’ IBE scheme is obtained
by ignoring the computation of c3 in encapsulation as well as the consistency check in decapsulation.
Relation to the Encryption Scheme from BMW. Clearly, IB-KEM implies traditional public-key encapsulation by simply
ignoring all operations related to the identity. We remark that viewed in this light (i.e., ignoring the element c2 in
encapsulation/decapsulation and ignoring the key-derivation algorithm) our IB-KEM is simplified to the chosen-ciphertext
secure encryption scheme recently proposed in [15,38].
4.5. Security
Theorem 4.1. Assume TCR is a family of target collision resistant hash functions. Under the Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellman
(BDDH) assumption relative to generator G, the IB-KEM from Section 4.2 is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
In particular, given an adversary A attacking the chosen-ciphertext security of the IB-KEM with advantage εA(k) =
Advibkem-ccaIBKEM ,A(k) and running time TA(k), we construct an adversary B breaking the BDDH assumption with advantage εB(k) =
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AdvbddhG,B (k) and running time TB(k), and an adversary H breaking TCR with advantage εH(k) = AdvtcrTCR,H(k) and running
time TH(k) ≈ TA(k) with
εB(k) ≥ εA(k)− εH(k)10nq −
q
p
;
TB(k) ≤ TA + O(n3 · ε−2A (k) · ln((nqεA(k))−1) · TZ + q · TPG(k)),
where q < p/(2(n+ 1)) is an upper bound on the number of key-derivation/decryption queries made by adversaryA, TPG is the
time for one exponentiation/pairing computation in PG, and TZ is the time for one addition over integers smaller than 2q.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is deferred to Section 6.
5. Extensions
5.1. Chosen-ciphertext secure hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation
Hierarchical identity-based key encapsulation (HIB-KEM) is a generalization of IB-KEM to identities supporting
hierarchical structures [32,27]. By the relation to Waters HIBE scheme it is easy to see that our technique can also be used
to make chosen-ciphertext secure the KEM variant of Waters HIBE. To be more precise, we modify Waters’ HIB-KEM and
add one more element (ut1u
λ
2u3)
r to the the ciphertext, where t was computed by applying a target-collision hash function
to g r (here r is the randomness used to create the ciphertext). The additional element is used for a consistency check at
decryption, with the novelty that the hierarchy’s depth λ is encoded via uλ2 . The security reduction is exponential in the
depth λ of the hierarchy, i.e. it introduces, roughly, a multiplicative factor of (nq)λ. Hence the scheme can only be securely
instantiated for small hierarchies, say λ ≤ 4.
More precisely, the new HIB-KEM setup algorithm chooses d different and independent hash functions Hj
$← HGen(G1)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ d and u1, u2, u3 ← G1. The private key for the identity −→id = (id1, . . . , idλ) of depth 1 ≤ λ ≤ d is defined
as usk[−→id ] = (d0, d1, . . . , dλ), where dj = g rj and rj $← Zp for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, while d0 = α · (∏λj=1 Hj(idj)rj). Encapsulation
with respect to
−→
id is defined as C = (c0, . . . , cλ, cλ+1), where c0 = g r and cj = Hj(idj)r for r $← Zp, 1 ≤ j ≤ λ, while
cλ+1 = (ut1uλ2u3)r , with t = TCR(g r). Finally, decapsulation K of a ciphertext C = (c0, c1, . . . , cλ, cλ+1) with respect to
−→
id
is obtained by choosing s0, . . . , sλ
$← Zp and computing
K =
eˆ
(
c0, d0 · (ut1uλ2u3)s0 ·
λ∏
j=1
Hj(idj)sj
)
eˆ(g s0 , cλ+1) ·
λ∏
j=1
eˆ(cj, dj · g sj)
.
Here we used our ‘‘implicit rejection’’ technique from Section 4.3 to decrease the number of pairings needed for
decapsulation to λ+ 2.
We note that the HIB-KEM constructionmentioned in the proceedings version of this paper [40] was incorrect and hence
not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. This was also independently discovered and fixed in [51], where details of the
proof were worked out.
5.2. Identity-based encryption
Given a IB-KEM and a symmetric encryption scheme, a hybrid identity-based encryption scheme can be obtained by
using the IB-KEM to securely transport a random session key that is fed into the symmetric encryption scheme to encrypt
the plaintext message. It is known that if both the IB-KEM and the symmetric encryption scheme are chosen-ciphertext
secure, then the resulting hybrid encryption is also chosen-ciphertext secure [21,7]. The security reduction is tight.
Using the ‘‘encrypt-then-mac’’ paradigm [3], a symmetric encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks
can be built from relatively weak primitives, i.e. from any one-time symmetric encryption scheme, such as the one-time
pad [57], by adding a message authentication code (MAC). Furthermore, Phan and Pointcheval [47] showed that super
pseudorandom permutations directly imply redundancy-free chosen-ciphertext secure symmetric encryption that avoid the
use of the MAC. Such strong pseudorandom permutations can in turn be generated by applying a 2-round Feistel network
to a pseudorandom function (and furthermore two pairwise independent permutations) [45]. However, it practice it seems
reasonable to assume that modern block-ciphers such as AES are already strong pseudorandom permutations. Provided
that the underlying block-cipher is a strong pseudorandom permutation, the modes of operation CMC [29], EME [30], and
EME* [28] can be used to encrypt largemessages. Hence a chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme can be built fromour IB-KEM
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construction without any additional overhead: the ciphertext overhead of our IBE scheme, that is the difference between
ciphertext and message size, is the asymmetric IB-KEM part, i.e. three group elements.
We note that for the natural task of securely generating a joint random session key, a IB-KEM is sufficient and a fully-
fledged identity-based encryption scheme is not needed.
5.3. A tradeoff between public-key size and security reduction
As independently discovered in [18,43], there exists an interesting trade-off between key-size of Waters’ hash H and the
security reduction of the IBE scheme.
The construction modifies Waters hash H as follows: Let the integer l = l(k) be a new parameter of the scheme. In
particular, we represent an identity id ∈ {0, 1}n as an n/l-dimensional vector id = (id1, . . . , idn/l), where each idi is an
l bit string. Waters hash is then redefined to H : {0, 1}n → G1, with H(id) = h0∏n/li=1 hidii for random public elements
h0, h1, . . . , hn/l ∈ G1. Waters’ original hash function is obtained as the special case l = 1. It is easy to see that using this
modification in our IBE scheme (i) reduces the size of the public key from n + 4 to n/l + 4 group elements, whereas (ii) it
adds another multiplicative factor of 2l to the security reduction of the IBE scheme (Theorem 4.1).1
5.4. Selective-identity chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM
For the definition of a selective-identity chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM we change the security experiment such
that the adversary has to commit to the target identity id∗ before seeing the public key. Clearly, this is a weaker security
requirement. We quickly note that (using an algebraic technique from [8]) by replacingWaters’ hash Hwith H(id) = h0 · hid1
(for id ∈ Zp) we get a selective-id chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM. Note that the size of the public key of this scheme drops
to 3 elements.
6. Security analysis
We give a game-based proof of Theorem 4.1. Our proof is mainly based on the one given byWaters [58], where wemake
some important modifications to be able to deal with chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover, we are able to substantially
improve the bound on the running time of the BDDH adversary B compared to [58].
Intuitively, security can be best understood by observing that our scheme is a generalization of Waters’ IBE scheme, as
well as of the chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encapsulation scheme from [15,38].
Before we give the proof we recall the ‘‘Difference Lemma’’ [56].
Lemma 6.1. Let X1, X2, B be events defined in some probability distribution, and suppose that X1 ∧ ¬B ⇔ X2 ∧ ¬B. Then
|Pr [ X1 ]− Pr [ X2 ]| ≤ Pr [ B ].
6.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let A be an adversary on the CCA security of the IB-KEM. We will consider a sequence of games, Game 0, Game 2, . . . ,
Game 10, each game involving A. At the end of each game there is a well-defined output bit β ′ ∈ {0, 1}. Let Xi be the event
that in Game i, it holds that β ′ = 1.
Game 0. (Real CCA experiment) Let Game 0 be IB-KEM security experiment of Section 2.2 with γ = 1 (the real CCA
experiment). While describing the experiment we will make a couple of conventions on how the experiment chooses the
values appearing in the game. These conventionswill be purely conceptual and, compared to the original experiment, do not
change the distribution of any value appearing during the experiment. We will also make a couple of definitions of values
appearing during the experiment.
We assume that in the beginning the experiment chooses some values a, b, and c , uniformly distributed over Zp. The
experiment will depend on these values (i.e., the key generationwill depend on ga, gb, user secret key generation on gab and
the challenge ciphertext will depend on c). In sequel games the experiment will ‘‘forget" the values gab, and c and instead
only use the values ga, gb, and gc . The dependencies of the different experiment phases ‘‘Challenge’’, ‘‘Extract’’, and ‘‘Decaps’’
on those values in Games 0–10 are depicted in the following table.
Game 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Challenge c c c c c c c c c eˆ(g, g)abc –
Extract gab gab gab gab gab – – – – – –
Decaps gab gab gab gab gab gab gab gab – – –
1 On the technical side our proof basically stays the same, only the bound from Lemma 6.2 needs to be adapted to take the modified Waters’ hash into
account.
E. Kiltz, D. Galindo / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 5093–5111 5101
Key Generation. Initially the experiment generates public-key pk = (u1, u2, z,H) and secret-key sk = α using the IB-KEM
key generation algorithm Kg(1k). We make the convention that the public key is generated as
u1 ← ga, u2 $← G1, z ← eˆ(ga, gb), h0 $← G1, . . . , hn $← G1, (1)
depending on the elements a, b. Note that the way the value z = eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, gab) from the public key is generated
implies α = gab. The public key is given to the adversary A to start its find phase.
Find Phase.During its execution adversaryAmakes a number of key-derivation and decapsulation requests. If the adversary
makes a key-derivation query Ex(id) then the experiment computes the secret key sk[id] by using the master secret key
α, and returns sk[id] to the adversary. If the adversary makes a decapsulation query Dec(id, C) the experiment (using α)
decrypts the ciphertext and returns the corresponding key to the adversary.
Eventually, the adversary returns a target identity id∗. The experiment runs the encapsulation algorithm to create a real
challenge key K ∗1 together with the the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (c∗1 , c∗2 , c∗3 ). We make the convention that challenge
key/ciphertext are computed using randomness c ∈ Zp as follows
c∗1 ← gc, c∗2 ← H(id∗)c, c∗3 ← (ut
∗
1 u2)
c, K ∗1 ← zc, (2)
where t∗ ← TCR(c∗1 ).
The experiment returns the challenge ciphertext C∗ together with the real key K ∗1 to adversary A.
Guess Phase. The adversary continues to make its oracle queries, subsequent key-derivation requests must be different
from the target identity id∗ and decapsulation requests must be different from (id∗, C∗). Finally, adversary A returns a bit
γ ′ ∈ {0, 1} and the experiment returns β ′ = γ ′.
Note that the experiment behaves exactly as in the original real CCA IB-KEM security experiment with γ = 1, i.e., we
have
Pr[X0] = Pr[Expibkem-cca-1IBKEM ,A = 1].
Now a few important definitions are in place. During its execution A may query the key-derivation oracle for some
identity id or the decapsulation oracle for the identity/ciphertext pair (id, C). We collect all those identities used to make
queries to the key-derivation and decapsulation oracle in the set I˜D. Note that I˜Dmay contain the target identity id∗ or one
identity more than once. Let ID be the subset of queried identities obtained by removing from I˜D all multiples and the target
identity. We write ID = {id(1), . . . , id(q0)} (without any particular order) for some q0 ≤ q such that id(i) 6= id(j) for each
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ q0 and id∗ 6∈ ID. Furthermore, we define ID∗ = ID ∪ {id∗} = {id(1), . . . , id(q0), id∗}.
Game 1. (Eliminate hash collisions) Note that the values c∗1 = C and t∗ = TCR(C) from the challenge ciphertext (Eq. (2))
are completely independent of the view of adversaryA untilA is in guess phase. This holds since C is simply not touched by
the experiment before generating the challenge ciphertext. Therefore wemay assume that the value c∗1 is already generated
by the experiment before the key generation (and then before the seed s for TCR = TCRs is chosen).
In this game the experiment changes its answers to all decapsulation queries Dec(id, C) made by A as follows: Let
C = (c1, c2, c3) and t = TCR(c1). If t = t∗ and c1 6= c∗1 , the experiment aborts and returns β ′ = 1. Otherwise it continues
as in the last game. Let HashAbort be the event that this new abortion rule applies. Until HashAbort happens Game 0 and
Game 1 are identical. Therefore by Lemma 6.1 we have
| Pr[X1] − Pr[X0]| ≤ Pr[HashAbort].
Furthermore, there exists an adversaryH against the target collision resistance of TCR running in time TH(k) ≈ TA(k) that
succeeds with probability at least Pr[HashAbort], i.e.,
Pr[HashAbort] ≤ AdvtcrTCR,H(k).
This adversary H inputs a random c∗1 = gc and runs the real CCA experiment. Note that H can simulate the whole Game 0
depending only on c∗1 = gc by knowing a, b. Furthermore,H sets up the public key such that it knows logg(u2) and logg(hi)
and hence can create the challenge ciphertext from Eq. (2). WhenHashAbort happens,H simply outputs c1 and terminates.
Game 2. (Change of public key) This is the same as Game 1 except that the experiment changes the generation of the public
key pk from Eq. (1) as follows.
Set m = 2q (the choice of m will become clear later). Instead of generating the hash keys as in Eq. (1) the experiment
now chooses
x0, x1, . . . , xn
$← {0, . . . , p− 1}
y′0, y1, . . . , yn
$← {0, . . . ,m− 1}
`
$← {0, . . . , n} (3)
and sets
y0 ← y′0 − `m.
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The public keys h = (h0, . . . , hn) of the hash function H are then defined as hi = gxiuyi1 , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. By definition the
public hash function evaluated in identity id ∈ {0, 1}n is given as H(id) = h0∏ni=1 hidii . From the experiments’ point of view,
however, the hash function evaluated in id ∈ {0, 1}n looks like
H(id) = gx(id)uy(id)1 , (4)
with x(id) = x0 +∑ni=1 idixi and y(id) = y0 +∑ni=1 idiyi only known to the experiment. On the other hand, note that this
change does not affect the distribution of the hash keys h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn). Therefore we have
Pr[X2] = Pr[X1].
Game 3. (Abort at the end of the game) Fix all the random variables adversary A gets to see during its execution,
including its random coin tosses: fix pk, and the randomness used in answering the key-derivation and decapsulation
queries. Now adversary A can be seen as a deterministic algorithm, in particular the set of all queried (distinct) identities
ID∗ = {id(1), . . . , id(q0), id∗} can be seen as fixed. By viewA we denote all these fixed variables.
Define Y = {y′0, y1, . . . , yn, `}, where the random variables {y′0, y1, . . . , yn, `} are distributed as in Eq. (3). It is clear that
once viewA is fixed, the random variable Y still has its original distribution (due to the random masks xi ∈ Zp). Define the
event
ForcedAbort :
q0∨
i=1
(
y(id(i)) = 0 mod p) ∨ y(id∗) 6= 0 mod p.
We call this abort forced since in sequel games the experiment is modified such that it always has to abort once this event
happens. For fixed viewA we define
η(viewA) := Pr
Y
[¬ForcedAbort]. (5)
The following lemma bounds η(viewA).
Lemma 6.2. For every fixed viewA, we have
λlow := 14(n+ 1)q ≤ η(viewA) ≤
1
2q
=: λup.
This lemma is as an extension of a lemma by Waters [58] who only proved the lower bound on η(viewA). Its proof is quite
technical and is postponed to Section 6.2.
Compared to Game 2 we will make two modifications to the experiment in Game 3. The experiment is exactly the same
as in Game 2 until adversary A outputs his guess bit γ ′. Since adversary A already terminated we can assume viewA to be
fixed from now on.
First modification: add forced abort. After adversary A outputs his guess bit γ ′, the experiment checks if the event
ForcedAbort occurs. If yes, the experiment returns β ′ = 0 and aborts. Otherwise, it continues as before, i.e., it returns
β ′ = γ ′.
Let us first make two unsuccessful attempts to meaningfully relate the two events X3 and X2. First, by the
Difference Lemma (Lemma 6.1) we have that |Pr [ X3 ] − Pr [ X2 ]| ≤ Pr [ ForcedAbort ] which is not meaningful since
Pr [ ForcedAbort ] = 1− η(viewA) is close to 1 (Lemma 6.2).
Second, since Pr
[
β ′ = 1 | ForcedAbort ] = 0 we have Pr [ X3 ] = Pr [β ′ = 1 ] = Pr [ γ ′ = 1 | ¬ForcedAbort ] ·
Pr [¬ForcedAbort ]. Now we would like to continue with Pr [ γ ′ = 1 | ¬ForcedAbort ] = Pr [ γ ′ = 1 ] = Pr [ X2 ].
However, this is not correct since the experiment aborts with a probability η(viewA) which is a function in viewA, in
particular in the choices of the identities ID∗ = {id(1), . . . , id(q0), id∗} queried by adversary A. Hence the two events X2 and
¬ForcedAbort cannot be considered as independent. In the worst case it may happen that Pr [ γ ′ = 1 | ¬ForcedAbort ] ≈
0 even though Pr
[
γ ′ = 1 ] is non-negligible. Let λlow := 14(n+1)q be the lower bound on the abortion probability computed
in Lemma 6.2. To get rid of this unwanted dependence the experiment adds some artificial abort such that in total it always
aborts with probability around 1− λlow, independent of the view of the adversary viewA.
Second modification: add artificial abort. After adversary A outputs his guess bit γ ′, the experiment checks if the event
ForcedAbort occurs. If yes, the experiment returns β ′ = 0 and aborts. Otherwise, it continues as follows: first it samples
(using sufficiently many samples) an estimate η′(viewA) of the probability η(viewA) (over Y) that the event¬ForcedAbort
happens.2 We want to stress that viewA is fixed at this point so sampling does not involve running adversary A again. By
definition, this estimate η′(viewA) is a random variable that only depends on the queried identities id(1), . . . , id(q0), id∗ (and
the randomness used to sample).
2 Unfortunately, there seems not to be an efficient way to compute the exact value η(viewA), we can only bound it using Lemma 6.2. If there was one
we could greatly simplify our analysis.
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Depending on the estimate η′(viewA) the experiment distinguishes two cases:
Case η′(viewA) ≤ λlow: The experiment does not abort and continues as before, outputting β ′ = γ ′.
Case η′(viewA) > λlow:With probability 1 − λlow/η′(viewA) the experiment aborts and outputs β ′ = 0. With probability
λlow/η
′(viewA) the experiment does not abort and continues as before, outputting β ′ = γ ′.
This concludes the description of Game 3.
The following lemma relating the events X2 and X3 will be proved in Section 6.3. Compared to the corresponding lemma
byWaters [58] it also makes use of the upper bound on η(viewA) from Lemma 6.2 to show that a fewer number of samples
is sufficient to compute the estimate η′(viewA).
Lemma 6.3. Let ρ(k) > 0 be a function in k. If the experiment takes
s(k) := O(n2ρ−2(k) ln ((nqρ(k))−1) )
samples when computing the estimate η′(viewA), then
|Pr[X2] − 4(n+ 1)q · Pr[X3]| ≤ ρ(k).
Furthermore, the s(k) samples can be computed in O(ns(k) · TZ) time.
The parameter ρ(k)will be determined at the end of the proof.
Game 4. (Forced abort during the game I) Compared to the last game we make the following changes to the experiment:
When identity id ∈ ID is queried to the key-derivation oracle, the experiment immediately aborts and returns β ′ = 0 if
y(id) = 0 mod p. When receiving the challenge identity id∗, the experiment immediately aborts and returns β ′ = 0 if
y(id∗) 6= 0 mod p. The artificial abort at the end of the experiment is the same as in the last game.
Clearly, this modification does not affect the adversary if there is no forced abort. In case there is a new forced abort the
experiment outputs β ′ = 0 as in Game 3. Therefore we have
Pr [ X4 ] = Pr [ X3 ].
Game 5. (Change key-derivation oracle) The experiment changes its answers to all key-derivation queries Ex(id)made by
the adversaryA as follows: By Eq. (4) we have H(id) = gx(id)uy(id)1 for some values x(id) and y(id) known to the experiment.
Case y(id) = 0 mod p: The experiment aborts and returns β ′ = 0 (as in the last game).
Case y(id) 6= 0 mod p: The derived key sk[id] = (d1, d2) is computed as follows:
For a random r ′ ∈ Zp, the experiment implicitly defines r = −b/y(id)+ r ′ mod p and computes
d1 ← (gb)−x(id)/y(id)gx(id)r ′uy(id)r ′1 ,
d2 ← (gb)−1/y(id) · g r ′ .
Note that the randomness r is not known to the experiment. Furthermore, the generation of the derived keys sk[id] =
(d1, d2) only depends on gb and does not involve the knowledge of the secret key α = gab anymore. (However, the
experiment still needs α to answer decapsulation queries.)
Lemma 6.4. Pr[X5] = Pr[X4].
Proof. We have to verify that each derived key sk[id] = (d1, d2) is identically distributed as in the last game. Let us
abbreviate x = x(id), and y = y(id) 6= 0 mod p. Clearly, if r ′ is uniform in Zp so is r . Then by Eq. (1) and since r ′ = r + b/y,
d1 = (gb)−x/ygxr ′uyr ′1
= g−bx/ygxr ′uyr ′1
= g−bx/ygx(r+b/y)uy(r+b/y)1
= g−bx/ygxr+bx/yuyr+b1
= ub1 · gxruyr1
= α · (gxuy1)r
= α · (H(id))r ,
d2 = (gb)−1/y · g r ′
= g−b/y · g r+b/y
= g r ,
are distributed as in the last game (the original experiment).
Game 6. (Change of the public key) In this game the experiment will modify the generation of the value u2 from the public
key pk. The experiment picks a random d ∈ Zp and computes the value u2 as u2 = (ga)−t∗gd, where t∗ = TCR(c∗1 ). To
summarize, the public key pk = (u1, u2, z,H) is now computed as
u1 ← ga, u2 ← (ga)−t∗gd, z ← eˆ(ga, gb), (6)
the hash keys as in Eq. (3), and the secret key sk as α = gab = ub1 that is still known to the experiment. The simulation of
A’s queries is done as before, using the secret key α. Note that the public key is identically distributed as in the last game.
Therefore we have
Pr[X6] = Pr[X5].
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Game 7. (Forced abort during the game II) Compared to the last game we make the following changes to the experiment:
When the tuple (id, C) is queried to the decapsulation oracle for id ∈ ID∪{id∗} and C = (c1, c2, c3) the experiment computes
t = TCR(c1) and immediately aborts if y(id) = 0 mod p, C is consistent, and t = t∗. In case of abort the experiment returns
β ′ = 0.
Lemma 6.5. | Pr[X7] − Pr[X6]| ≤ qp .
Proof. Clearly, thismodification does not affect the adversary if there is no new forced abort. Note that any new forced abort
implies c1 = c∗1 since otherwise by t = t∗ the experiment already aborted in the last game (having found a collision in the
hash function TCR). In case of a new forced abort we distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: the new forced abort happens during the guess stage. Recall that we call a ciphertext C = (c1, c2, c3) consistent
if (g, c1, ut1u2, c3) is a Diffie–Hellman tuple (where t = TCR(c1)), i.e., if (g, c1, ut1u2, c3) = (g, g r , ut1u2, (ut1u2)r) for some
value r ∈ Zp. Note that the way the public key pk is generated by Eq. (6) and since c1 = c∗1 , and t = t∗, for a consistent
ciphertext C we have
c3 = (ut1u2)r = ((ga)t−t
∗
gd)r = (ca1)t−t
∗ · cd1 = (c∗1 )d = c∗3 , (7)
where d ∈ Zp is only known to the experiment. If id = id∗ (i.e., ifA queries the decapsulation oracle with the target identity)
then c∗2 = c2. Consequently C = C∗ and so the experiment rejects as in the original IB-KEM security experiment. If id 6= id∗
then, by definition, id ∈ ID and the experiment outputs β ′ = 0 as in Game 6 where the abort was still done at the end of the
experiment. Therefore, conditioned on case 1 this does not change the distribution of β ′ and we have Pr[X7] = Pr[X6].
Case 2: the new forced abort happens during A’s find stage. Since in the find stage the adversary has no information (in a
statistical sense) about c∗1 from the challenge ciphertext C∗, and the adversary makes at most q decapsulation queries in its
find stage, this implies
| Pr[X7] − Pr[X6]| ≤ qp
and concludes the proof.
Game 8. (Change the answers to the decapsulation queries) In the last game decapsulation queries were either aborted
or answered using the secret key α, as in the original experiment. In this game the experiment changes its answers to its
decapsulation queries Dec(id, C) made by A as follows: By Eqn. (4) we have H(id) = gx(id)uy(id)1 for some values x(id) and
y(id) known to the experiment.
Case y(id) 6= 0 mod p: the query is answered using sk[id] obtained from the key-derivation oracle.
Case y(id) = 0 mod p: the experiment simulates the decapsulation queries as follows: Let C = (c1, c2, c3) be the queried
ciphertext and let t = TCR(c1).
If the ciphertext is not consistent then return reject
If t = t∗ then the experiment aborts and returns β ′ = 0 (as in the last game)
if t 6= t∗ then return K ← eˆ(c3/cd1, gb)(t−t∗)−1 .
Note that from this point on the experiment does not depend on the knowledge of sk = gab anymore.
Lemma 6.6. Pr[X8] = Pr[X7].
Proof. Let C = (c1, c2, c3) be an arbitrary ciphertext submitted to the decapsulation oracle with respect to identity id. If
y(id) 6= 0 mod p then decapsulation is done using the simulation of the key-derivation oracle which we already showed to
be correct so we may now assume y(id) = 0 mod p. Furthermore we may assume C is consistent because otherwise it gets
rejected, as in the last game.
Case 1a: t = t∗ and c1 6= c∗1 . In this case the experiment has found a collision in the hash function TCR and returns β ′ = 0
(as in the last game).
Case 1b: t = t∗ and c1 = c∗1 . In this case the experiment returns β ′ = 0 as in the forced abort introduced in the last game.
Case 2: t 6= t∗. Similar to Eq. (7) consistency of C implies
c3 = (ut1u2)r = ((ga)t−t
∗
gd)r = (ca1)t−t
∗ · cd1, (8)
and we obtain
(c3/cd1)
(t−t∗)−1 = ((ca1)t−t
∗
cd1/c
d
1)
(t−t∗)−1 = ca1 . (9)
In the original IB-KEM decapsulation algorithm first the secret key for identity id is computed as sk[id] = (d1, d2) =
(α · H(id)s, g s) for random s = s(id), and then the session key K is reconstructed as
K = eˆ(c1, d1)/eˆ(c2, d2) = eˆ(c1, α) · eˆ(c1,H(id)s)/eˆ(c2, g s)
= eˆ(ca1, gb) · (eˆ(c1,H(id))/eˆ(c2, g))s
(9)= eˆ((c3/cd1)(t−t
∗)−1 , gb) · (eˆ(c1,H(id)s/eˆ(c2, g))s
= eˆ(c3/cd1, gb)(t−t
∗)−1 ,
with∆′(C) = eˆ(c1,H(id))/eˆ(c2, g) = 1 by consistency. This shows correctness of the new decapsulation algorithm.
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Game 9. (Modify the challenge) After A’s find stage the experiment inputs the target identity id∗ from A. The experiment
modifies the computation of the challenge ciphertext C∗ follows:
Case y(id∗) 6= 0 mod p: The experiment aborts (as in the last game).
Case y(id∗) = 0 mod p: The experiment creates the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (c∗1 , c∗2 , c∗3 ) and key K ∗1 as
c∗1 ← gc, c∗2 ← (gc)x(id
∗), c∗3 ← (gc)d, K ∗1 ← eˆ(g, g)abc . (10)
By virtue of Eqs. (4) and (8), and since TCR(c∗1 ) = t∗ and y(id∗) = 0 mod p, C∗ is a correctly distributed ciphertext of K ∗1 .
Note that the generation of the challenge ciphertext now only depends on gc and eˆ(g, g)abc , instead of c as in the last game.
Clearly,
Pr[X9] = Pr[X8].
Game 10. (RandomCCA experiment) The experiment replaces the value K ∗1 from the challenge C∗with K
∗
0 , where K
∗
0
$← GT .
This precisely models the IB-KEM CCA experiment with γ = 0 (random game) and hence we have
Pr[X10] = Pr[Expibkem-cca-0IBKEM ,A = 1].
Observe that Game 10 does not use the secret key anymore and that the whole simulation only depends on the values
ga, gb, gc . Game 9 and Game 10 are equal unless adversaryA can distinguish K ∗1 = eˆ(g, g)abc (in Game 9) from K ∗0 (in Game
10), where K0
$← GT . Therefore we have
| Pr[X10] − Pr[X9]| ≤ AdvbddhG,B (k),
for any adversary B against the hardness of BDDH running in the same time as the experiment, i.e.,
TB(k) = TA(k)+ O(ns(k) · TZ + q · TPG(k)), (11)
where s(k) is the number of samples from Lemma 6.3 the experiment needs in order to compute η′(viewA).
Analysis. Collecting the probabilities relating the different games we have shown that given an adversary A that runs in
time TA(k) and has advantage εA(k) = Advibkem-ccaIBKEM ,A, there exists an adversary B with advantage εB(k) = AdvbddhG,B (k) and
an adversaryH that runs in time TH(k) ≈ TA(k)with advantage εH(k) = AdvtcrTCR,H(k) such that
εA(k) =
∣∣ Pr[X0] − Pr[X10]∣∣
≤ ∣∣ Pr[X1] − Pr[X10]| + | Pr[X0] − Pr[X1]∣∣
≤ ∣∣ Pr[X1] − Pr[X10]∣∣+ εH(k)
≤ ∣∣4(n+ 1)q · Pr [ X3 ]− Pr[X10]∣∣+ ρ(k)+ εH(k)
≤ ∣∣4(n+ 1)q · (Pr [ X7 ]+ q/p)− Pr[X10]∣∣+ ρ(k)+ εH(k)
≤ ∣∣4(n+ 1)q · (Pr [ X9 ]+ q/p)− Pr[X10]∣∣+ ρ(k)+ εH(k)
≤ 4(n+ 1)q · (εB(k)+ q/p)+ ρ(k)+ εH(k).
The above implies
εB(k) ≥ εA(k)− εH(k)− ρ(k)5nq −
q
p
. (12)
Defining
ρ(k) := 1
2
εA(k), (13)
we obtain
εB(k) ≥ εA(k)− εH(k)10nq −
q
p
,
where q is an upper bound on all (derivation plus decapsulation) queries made by A. Using Eq. (11) and the bound on s(k)
from Lemma 6.3 we bound B’s running time as
TB(k) = TA(k)+ O(n · s(k) · TZ + q · TPG(k))
= TA(k)+ O(n · n2ρ−2(k) ln
(
(nqρ(k))−1
) · TZ + q · TPG(k))
= TA(k)+ O(n3ε−2A · ln((nqεA)−1) · TZ(k)+ q · TPG(k)).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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6.2. Proof of Lemma 6.2
Fix viewA and hence the queried identities id(1), . . . , id(q0), id∗. We abbreviate η = η(viewA). For an integer t , define the
event
Et :
q0∧
i=1
(y(id(i)) 6= 0 mod t) ∧ y(id∗) = 0 mod t.
With this notation recall that η = PrY[Ep] and we intend to show that
1
4(n+ 1)q ≤ η ≤
1
2q
. (14)
(Also recall that Y = {y′0, y1, . . . , yn, `}, where the random variables {y′0, y1, . . . , yn, `} are distributed as in Eq. (3).) Over
the integers we have by Eq. (3) y(id) = y′0 +
∑n
i=1 idiyi − `m for some integer 0 ≤ ` ≤ n+ 1, where 0 ≤ y′0 +
∑n
i=1 idiyi <
(n + 1)m < p. If ` = `∗ := b(y′0 +
∑n
i=1 id
∗
i yi)/mc and y(id∗) = 0 mod m, then clearly y(id∗) = 0 mod p. On the other
hand, if y(id) 6= 0 mod m then y(id) 6= 0 mod p. Hence,
η = Pr
Y
[Ep] ≥ Pr[` = `∗] Pr
Y
[Ep | ` = `∗]
= 1
n+ 1 PrY [Ep | ` = `
∗]
≥ 1
n+ 1 PrY [Em | ` = `
∗]
= 1
n+ 1 PrY′ [Em],
where the probability space Y′ contains the random variables {y′0, y1, . . . , yn} distributed according to Eq. (3), for fixed `.
Define PrY′ [Em] =: ηm. Since trivially ηm ≥ η, we obtain
1
n+ 1 · ηm ≤ η ≤ ηm. (15)
It remains to compute an upper and lower bound on ηm.
Let id 6= id′ and a, b ∈ Z. We collect some simple observations on function y(·) which essentially show that the
y(·) mod m are pairwise independent:
Pr
Y′
[y(id) = b mod m] = 1/m (16)
Pr
Y′
[y(id) = a mod m | y(id′) = b mod m] = 1/m. (17)
Eq. (16) follows since for any choice of y1, . . . , yn there is a single choice of y′0 that will make the condition hold. To show
Eq. (17) assume there exists an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that idi = 1 and id′i = 0. Then fix all yj’s for j 6= i except yi so that y(id′) =
b. Therefore Pr
[
y(id) = a | y(id′) = b ] = 1/m. If there is no such i then we can use Bayes to reverse roles of id and id′.
We continue to bound ηm with
ηm = Pr
Y′
[
q0∧
i=1
y(id(i)) 6= 0 mod m | y(id∗) = 0 mod m
]
· Pr[y(id∗) = 0 mod m]
(16)= 1
m
· Pr
Y′
[
q0∧
i=1
y(id(i)) 6= 0 mod m | y(id∗) = 0 mod m
]
= 1
m
·
(
1− Pr
Y′
[
q0∨
i=1
y(id(i)) = 0 mod m | y(id∗) = 0 mod m
])
≥ 1
m
·
(
1−
q0∑
i=1
Pr
Y′
[y(id(i)) = 0 mod m | y(id∗) = 0 mod m]
)
(18)
(17)= 1
m
·
(
1−
q0∑
i=1
1
m
)
= 1
m
·
(
1− q
m
)
= 1
4q
,
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where the last equation follows by our choice of m = 2q which minimizes the term. Furthermore, we obtain ηm ≤ 1/m =
1/(2q) by replacing the union bound from Eq. (18) by the trivial bound (1 − PrY′ [· · · ]) ≤ 1. Together with Eq. (15) this
proves Eq. (14).
6.3. Proof of Lemma 6.3
For the proof we can assume ρ ≤ 1 since otherwise the lemma is trivially true.
Let ArtAbort be the event that the experiment artificially aborts at the end of the simulation. Let Abort = ArtAbort ∨
ForcedAbort be the event that it aborts artificially or forced. First we claim
Claim 6.7. For any fixed viewA, | Pr[¬Abort] − λlow| ≤ λlowρ .
The proof of the claim is postponed until later. Since the claim holds for any fixed viewA it also remains true conditioned
on γ ′ = 1:
|Pr [ ¬Abort | γ ′ = 1 ]− λlow| ≤ λlowρ. (19)
In case of abort the experiment outputs β ′ = 0, otherwise it outputs β ′ = γ ′. We continue computing Pr [ X3 ]:
Pr [ X3 ] = Pr
[
β ′ = 1 ∧ Abort ]+ Pr [β ′ = 1 ∧ ¬Abort ]
= 0+ Pr [β ′ = 1 ∧ ¬Abort ]
= Pr [ γ ′ = 1 ∧ ¬Abort ]
= Pr [ ¬Abort | γ ′ = 1 ] · Pr [ γ ′ = 1 ]
= Pr [ ¬Abort | γ ′ = 1 ] · Pr [ X2 ]
where the last equation holds since Pr [ X2 ] = Pr
[
γ ′ = 1 ], i.e., in Game 2 the experiment outputs whatever adversary A
outputs.
Combining this with Eq. (19) we get
|Pr [ X3 ]− λlow · Pr [ X2 ]| = Pr[X2] · |Pr
[ ¬Abort | γ ′ = 1 ]− λlow|
≤ Pr [ X2 ] · λlowρ
≤ λlowρ.
It remains to prove Claim 6.7 which requires the following bound from [31].
Lemma 6.8 (Hoeffding’s Bound). Let X1, . . . , Xs be independent random variables with a ≤ Xi ≤ b and define X = 1s ·
∑s
i=1 Xi.
Then, for any t > 0, we have the inequality
Pr[|X − E[X]| ≥ t] ≤ 2e−2s
(
t
b−a
)2
,
where E[X] denotes the expected values of X.
Proof of Claim 6.7. We abbreviate η = η(viewA) and η′ = η′(viewA). By construction the two events ArtAbort and
ForcedAbort are independent and consequently we have
Pr [¬Abort ] = Pr [¬ForcedAbort ] · Pr [¬ArtAbort ] = η · Pr [¬ArtAbort ]. (20)
We make
s(k) := 2q2 · (λlowρ)−2 ln
((
1
8
λlowρ
)−1)
= O(n2ρ−2(k) ln ((nqρ(k))−1)) (21)
samples to compute an approximation η′ of η, where λlow = 1/(4(n + 1)q). For each sample we pick y′0, y1, . . . , yn, `
independently according to the distribution Y from Eq. (3) which defines the function y(·). Depending on y(·), each indicator
variable Xi is defined as
Xi :=
1:
q0∧
i=1
(
y(id(i)) 6= 0 mod p) ∧ y(id∗) = 0 mod p
0: otherwise.
(22)
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By construction, λlow ≤ Pr [ Xi = 1 ] ≤ λup. Finally, we make a majority decision over all Xi by computing η′ =∑ 1
s(k) ·
∑s(k)
i=1 Xi. By construction, E[η′] = η ≥ λlow. Using Lemma 6.8 for the estimate η′ of η, with t := ηρ/4 and
b− a ≤ λup − λlow ≤ 1/(2q), we get3
Pr[|η′ − η| ≥ ηρ/4] < 2e−2s( ηρq2 )2
η≥λlow≤ 2e−2s
(
λlowρq
2
)2
(21)≤ 1
4
λlowρ.
Set ρ ′ := ρ/4. We call the approximation η′ ‘‘good’’ if |η′ − η| ≤ ηρ ′ and ‘‘bad’’ otherwise. Then the above establishes
Pr[η′ bad] ≤ λlowρ ′. (23)
For every fixed good η′ we have η(1− ρ ′) ≤ max{λlow, η′} ≤ η(1+ ρ ′). Since Pr [¬ArtAbort ] = λlow/max{λlow, η′} we
have
λlow
η(1+ ρ ′) ≤ Pr
[ ¬ArtAbort | η′ good ] ≤ λlow
η(1− ρ ′) (24)
We first give a lower bound on Pr [¬Abort ].
Pr [¬Abort ] (20)= η · Pr [¬ArtAbort ]
≥ η · Pr [ ¬ArtAbort | η′ good ] Pr [ η′ good ]
(23),(24)≥ η · λlow
η(1+ ρ ′) · (1− λlowρ
′)
≥ λlow · (1− ρ ′)2 ≥ λlow · (1− ρ).
We now turn to the upper bound on Pr [¬Abort ].
Pr [¬Abort ] (20)= η · (Pr [ ¬ArtAbort | η′ good ] Pr [ η′ good ]+ Pr [ ¬ArtAbort | η′ bad ] Pr [ η′ bad ])
≤ η · (Pr [ ¬ArtAbort | η′ good ]+ Pr [ η′ bad ])
(23),(24)≤ η ·
(
λlow
η(1− ρ ′) + λlowρ
′
)
≤ λlow ·
(
1
1− ρ ′ + ρ
′
)
ρ′≤1/4≤ λlow · (1+ 4ρ ′) = λlow · (1+ ρ).
To complete the proof we need to establish the bound on the running time necessary to compute the samples
X1, . . . , Xs(k). To compute one indicator variable Xi, one has to sample once from distribution Y and evaluate the functions
y(·) on y(id∗) and id(1), . . . , id(q) according to Eq. (22). Evaluating each of the functions y(·) takes n+ 1 additions modulo p.
Hence, the samples and hence the approximation η′ can be computed with O(qns(k)) additions modulo p.
We now sketch how to compute the approximation η′ with O(ns(k)) additions modulo p. Note that for most of the Xi’s
it is sufficient to check y(id∗) 6= 0 mod p in which case one can conclude Xi = 0. If y(id∗) = 0 mod p then one also has to
evaluate y(·) also on id(1), . . . , id(q). However, since by Eq. (16), PrY[y(id∗) = 0 mod p] ≤ PrY[y(id∗) = 0 mod m] ≤ 1/2q,
this only has to be done on an expected q fraction of all the samples. We therefore modify the simulation such that it aborts
whenever the total number of additions modulo p used to compute η′ exceeds c · ns(k), for some fixed constant c . Since
by the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 6.8) this additional abort only happens with negligible probability, it does not affect the
adversary’s overall success probability.
7. Comparison
In this section we compare our scheme with the previous chosen-ciphertext secure IBE schemes in the literature based
on the BDDH assumption.
Previous to this work there were basically two ways of building chosen-ciphertext secure IBE schemes in the standard
model. One way is to combine the IBE schemes [8,58] with the generic transformation from [11], the other one stems from
a remark from [15]. We will now carefully review both constructions and compare them to our proposed scheme.
3 At this point Waters [58] used b ≤ 1 instead of our refined upper bound b ≤ λup = 1/(2q) from Lemma 6.2.
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7.1. IB-KEM scheme obtained by the generic BCHK transformation
We begin by reviewing the generic transformations from any chosen-plaintext secure 2-HIBE into a chosen-ciphertext
secure IBE scheme by Boneh, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [11] (BCHK), We describe the CHK transformation in terms of key
encapsulation and note that this is not possible for the improved BK transformation.
The one-time signature-based BCHK method transforms any 2-level HIB-KEM into an IB-KEM scheme as follows: the
identity of the first level HIB-KEM becomes the identity of the IB-KEM scheme. To create a ciphertext of the IB-KEM a
random pair of one-time signing/verification keys is chosen. A HIB-KEM ciphertext for the message is created with respect
to the 2-level identity consisting of the HIB-KEM identity at the first level and the verification key at the second level. The
resulting HIB-KEM ciphertext is signed using the signing key. Finally, the IB-KEM ciphertext is then composed by the HIB-
KEM ciphertext, the signature, and the corresponding verification key. For decapsulation first the validity of the signature is
checked and then, conditioned it was correct, the HIB-KEM ciphertext is decapsulated using the hierarchical key-derivation
algorithm for the 2-level ‘‘identity’’ consisting of id plus the verification key.
It was proved in [11] that any chosen-plaintext secure 2-HIB-KEM with selective-identity security with respect to the
second level of the hierarchy and adaptive security at the first level is sufficient to obtain a chosen-ciphertext secure IBE.
Consequently, as noted in [58], the most efficient instantiation of this transformation is obtained from the hybrid HIB-KEM
using Waters IB-KEM [58] at the first level and Boneh/Boyen’s IB-KEM [8] at the second level.
Combining the results from [11] with [58,8] we get a chosen-ciphertext secure IB-KEM under the BDDH assumption.
Similar to our scheme, the security reduction roughly comes with a multiplicative factor of≈ nq.
7.2. IB-KEM mentioned in BMW
In contrast to [11], Boyen, Mei, andWaters [15] propose a non-black-box technique to obtain a chosen-ciphertext secure
IB-KEM from a 2-level HIB-KEM without relying on additional primitives like signatures or MACs. For concreteness we cite
their concrete statement (from Section 5.3 of the full version of [15]), referring to the two HIBE constructions from Boneh–
Boyen [8] and Waters [58]:
‘‘It is easy to see that we obtain the desired result [i.e. a construction avoiding a signature/MAC] very simply, by
extending the hierarchy in either HIBE construction by one level, and setting the ‘‘identity" for that last level to be the
hash value of the previous ciphertext components. This gives us (in theWaters case) an adaptive-identity CCA2-secure
HIBE, and (in the Boneh–Boyen case) a selective-identity CCA2-secure HIBE’’.
No theorem statement is given but it is clear that security relies on Waters 2-HIBE which has a loss-factor of roughly (nq)2
in the reduction from BDDH. We want to stress that in their construction the ‘‘hashing the previous ciphertext’’ makes it
basically impossible to replace the second level of Waters HIBE with the more efficient (but only weakly=selective-identity
secure) IBE scheme from Boneh–Boyen. This is since the challenge ciphertext depends on the target identity which is used
in the second level of the HIBE scheme and the target identity is not known until the adversary outputs it.
Since the construction usesWaters 2-HIBE the public key has to include two independent sets of hash public keys, i.e. the
public key contains roughly 2n elements from G1. For the same reason the security reduction of the proposed IBE scheme
depends on the security of Waters’ 2-HIBE which is quadratic in q and n.
7.3. A comparison
An efficiency comparison between the above two schemes, plus Waters original scheme, and our IBE is given in Fig. 2.
We further discuss it in the following prose. We stress that the performance of the security reduction is a crucial parameter
here. In light of the keysize/security reduction tradeoff from Section 5.3 we can also compare the BMW scheme to all
other schemes by ‘‘normalizing’’ the security reduction for all schemes to O(n2q2), i.e. by setting the tradeoff parameter
l to l = log2(nq) ≈ 20 + 7 = 27 (for very optimistic < 220 adversary queries and identities of n = 160 bits) we get a
public-key size of n/27 + 4 ≈ 9 group elements compared to the 2n + 3 = 323 group elements of BMW with the same
security.
The symmetric overhead of the BCHK transformation consists of a strong one-time signature plus a verification keywhich
sums up to≈ 1602 = 25 600 (‘‘security parameter squared’’) bits [23].
Since computing Waters hash requires computing n/2 products in G1 on the average, where n ≈ log2 p, it can be seen
as a single exponentiation. Therefore we count computing H(id)r for random r as two exponentiations. In the decapsulation
algorithmof our IB-KEMweassumeH(id) to be precomputed. The size of the secret key sk is the same for all three schemes—a
single element in G1.
To summarize, compared to the BMW IB-KEM from Section 7.2, our proposed chosen-ciphertext secure IBE scheme
achieves better performance and public-key sizeswith half of the BMWpublic-key size. In addition, the fact that our security
reduction is more efficient than that of the BMW scheme means that, for concrete values of the security parameter, our
ciphertexts are much shorter even if the two schemes have the same number of elements in the ciphertext.
In terms of computational efficiency our scheme has one fixed-based exponentiation more than the Hybrid +
CHK scheme from Section 7.1, but it does not have to resort on any kind of exogenous consistency check such as
5110 E. Kiltz, D. Galindo / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 5093–5111
Scheme CCA? Ciphertext Encapsulation Decapsulation Keysize Security
Overhead #pairings + #[multi,regular,fixed-base]-exp+... pk Reduction
Ours (§4)
√
3` 0+ [1, 3, 1] 3+ [1, 0, 2] n+ 4 nq
Hybrid + CHK (§7.1)
√
3`+25k (704) 0+ [1, 3, 1]+Sig 3+ [1, 0, 1]+Vfy n+ 4 nq
BMW (§7.2)
√
3`′ 0+ [0, 5, 1] 4+ [0, 1, 0] 2n+ 3 (nq)2
Waters – 2` 0+ [0, 3, 1] 2+ [0, 0, 0] n+ 2 nq
Fig. 2. Efficiency comparison for CCA-secure IB-KEMs for identity-space IDSp = {0, 1}n . BMW is the IB-KEM as proposed in [15], Hybrid + BK is the
Waters/BB hybrid HIB-KEM scheme applied to the CHK transformation as proposed in [58], and Waters is Waters’ original chosen-plaintext secure IBE
scheme [58]. The keysize is measured in terms of the number of group elements of the public key pk. Ciphertext overhead represents the difference in bits
between the ciphertext length and the message length. ` is the length of the representation of an element in G1 with respect to the security reduction
O(nq), while `′ is the length of a G1 group element with respect to the security reduction O(n2q2), and thus `  `′ . For comparison we mention that
relative timings for the various operations are as follows: bilinear pairing ≈ 5 [53], multi-exponentiation ≈ 1.5, regular exponentiation = 1, fixed-base
exponentiation 0.2.
a signature or a MAC. Since one fixed-based exponentiation is  0.2 regular exponentiations, we conclude that
encapsulation/decapsulation in our scheme is as efficient as in the Hybrid + CHK scheme. The most striking difference,
however, is that our scheme comes with shorter ciphertexts: for current security requirements the ciphertexts difference
(a strong one-time signature plus a verification key) amounts to a couple of thousand bits [23].
We remark that, in order to get a direct full IBE scheme (in contrast to an IB-KEM) we can also apply the MAC-based
BCHK transformation [11] to the construction from Section 7.1 and get a full IBE scheme with shorter ciphertexts. The latter
construction significantly reduces the ciphertext overhead compared to the CHK transformation by replacing the signature
with a MAC. Compared to our construction, however, there is still a difference in the ciphertext size of a MAC tag plus a
‘‘commitment’’ which sums up to≈ 576 bits [11].
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